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Abstract 
 
This article systematically scrutinizes the intergovernmental and administrative aspects of Franco-
German relations with the 1963 Elysée Treaty at their core. This treaty, together with its various ad-
ditions and extensions, has defined the basic processes of bilateral interaction between the French 
and German states. Recurrent tension in Franco-German relations notwithstanding, many observers 
and participants have viewed France and Germany to be connected particularly closely since the 
1960s. This article explores key elements of what it is that links France and Germany. Thereby it 
clarifies the concept of regularized intergovernmentalism, suggests viewing this specific set of inter-
national practices from a social-structural perspective, and evaluates the effects and limits of such 
regularized procedures. Its findings suggest that bilateral structures have complemented and under-
girded a broadly multilateral post-World War II world and are likely to continue to do so. 
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            The ups and downs of Franco-German relations in the postwar era have occupied journal-
ists, policymakers, and academic observers of politics alike. Recurrent tensions and reappearing traces 
of crisis notwithstanding, many of them have considered France and Germany to be particularly 
closely connected since the 1960s. However, in spite of standard references to this “special relation-
ship,” comprehensive and systematizing discussions of what it exactly is that supposedly links these 
two states are rare. This article focuses on the intergovernmental and administrative aspects of bi-
lateral Franco-German interchange, with the 1963 Elysée Treaty at its center. Thereby it clarifies the 
concept of regularized intergovernmentalism and argues to view this specific set of international 
practices from a social-structural perspective. 
 
Regularized intergovernmental processes are patterns of reiterated public interaction and 
communication by individuals in public or official functions who act as representatives of their states 
or state entities. Such processes have both a quantitative dimension of interaction density and a quail-
tative aspect; they can vary along both. The sets of interaction and communication that accumulate 
to characteristic patterns of regularized intergovernmentalism need not necessarily be constructive. 
They may be adversarial or cooperative, but they are regularized and reoccur over time. Thus regular-
ized intergovernmentalism comprises specific kinds of practices in the international realm. As more 
or less robust processes of reiterated interaction that both incarnate and perpetuate social meaning, 
they are social structures. They are part of an international institutional reality. 
 
Regularized intergovernmental practices have at least three kinds of partially overlapping 
effects: First, they standardize and routinize the conduct of the single states involved in the relations. 
They help to define “business as usual” among two or more states. They frame normal ways of hand-
ling things. They may channel how and why to solve problems and formulate policies in a wide range 
of policy domains. They keep issues on the agenda or bring them there; they make states “keep in 
touch.” Second, they bind and cultivate personnel. These are groups of people who deal with one an-
other professionally on a regularized basis. Third, they generate and perpetuate social meaning and 
purpose, such as the meaning of normality and normal expectations. They further may provide mo-
tives or reasons for or against certain goals and actions – alone or together with others. For example, 
if the quantitative interaction density among states is high, and especially if the relations are construc-
tive, the regularization of intergovernmentalism may generate pressures “to come up with some-
thing.” They legitimize and make intuitive some courses of action; they delegitimize and make im-
plausible others. By doing so they help to stabilize order in international affairs – not understood as 
the absence of conflict, but as regularization. And they engender rudiments of collective identity in 
the international sphere. 
 
Different scholars have identified multilateralism as a key institutional feature and defining 
social form of international relations after World War II.1  However, multilateral structures have not 
replaced bilateral ones. Many bilateral relationships have remained politically highly relevant within a 
broadly multilateral world. Interestingly enough, on the one hand many researchers have considered 
the European Union the most developed and most important multilateral institution of the 20th cen-
tury – irrespective of their disagreement on its proper conceptualization and workings.2  On the 
other hand it has been conventional wisdom that within the EC/EU framework, “nothing goes with-
out, nothing against Germany and France”: without basic Franco-German agreement there can be no 
progress in either deepening, widening, or even consolidating European integration. 
 
Indeed, there seems to be a strange tension between these two widely accepted positions: 
whereas scholars view the multilateral momentum central to Europe’s “new form of political or-
ganization,”3 the notion that unless the “Franco-German couple” is happy nothing moves has long 
                                                
1 See, for example, Reus-Smit 1999; Ruggie 1992;  and the many contributors to Ruggie 1993a. 
2 Hooghe and Marks 2001; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Moravcsik 1998; Pollack 2001; Ruggie 1993b. 
3 Olsen forthcoming, 26 of paper draft. 
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been a commonplace. This paper’s analytic discussion and empirical substance also invite the reader 
to begin rethinking the relation between multilateral and bilateral elements in postwar European af-
fairs and beyond. Its findings support the view that multilateralism does not replace bilateralism, but 
that the two will continue to coexist, and that in many cases bilateral relations will complement or 
undergird multilateral forms.4 
 
The Franco-German regularized intergovernmentalism has developed a dynamic of its own. 
Not least, it has helped to make France and Germany hang together for some four decades.5  Simul-
taneously, the limits of this regularized bilateralism have remained conspicuous. The two states fre-
quently fail to match its ambitions and the expectations it helps to generate. 
 
At the core of the regularized intergovernmental interaction between France and Germany is 
the Elysée Treaty. Together  with its various extensions and additions it constitutes the main frame 
of the intensive Franco-German bilateralism. The semiannual Franco-German summit meetings, 
which the Treaty has defined as regularized procedures, have grown tremendously in size since the 
1963 signing. Some have described them as joint Franco-German cabinet meetings. They cover all 
major foreign and domestic policy areas and often stretch across all levels of governmental and ad-
ministrative hierarchy, beginning with president, chancellor, and ministers. Additional Franco-
German intergovernmental regularization reaches beyond and below the main staple Elysée Treaty. 
 
In this article I first analyze in detail the intergovernmental and administrative fabric of bi-
lateral Franco-German affairs of the past four decades. Thus, this paper concentrates on key aspects 
of what it is that has made this bilateral relationship supposedly special and especially tight: the nature 
of a specific kind of regularized intergovernmentalism. Then I explore the impact and limitations of 
these regularized bilateral intergovernmental processes. And I submit to view regularized inter-
governmentalism from a bird’s eye perspective as social structures made up of more or less stable 
processes of reiterated interaction that incarnate and perpetuate social meaning. I clarify regularized 
intergovernmentalism as a specific set of international practices that help to define international 
systems or regional subsystems. In this view, the regularized Franco-German intergovernmentalism 
appears part of a bilateral polity. And, as such, it is an integral structural element of the European 
polity. 
 
Subsequently, Section One focuses on the Elysée Treaty as a whole, reviews its contents and 
its extensions and additions, analyzes the semiannual Franco-German summits that it engendered, 
and briefly looks at regularized Franco-German intergovernmentalism beyond and below the Treaty. 
Section Two analyzes regularized Franco-German intergovernmentalism across policy areas. Section 
Three evaluates regularized intergovernmentalism’s effects and limits, and concludes with a note on 
change and continuity within recurrent regularized processes. 
 
I. Structure as Process: Elysée Treaty as Main Frame 
 
On 22 January 1963, French President Charles de Gaulle, German Chancellor Konrad Ade-
nauer, French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, and Foreign Ministers Maurice Couve de Murville 
and Gerhard Schröder signed, in the Elysée Palace’s salon Murat, the “Treaty between the Federal Re-
public of Germany and the French Republic on Franco-German Cooperation.”6 Adenauer and de 
                                                
4 Compare von Bredow 1996. 
5 Compare Ruggie 1998. 
6 Official names of the treaty: Traité entre la République fédérale d’Allemagne et la République française sur la coopération 
germano-française / Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Französischen Republik über die deutsch-
französische Zusammenarbeit. After the location of its signing, the seat of the French president in Paris, the Treaty 
is commonly referred to as “Elysée Treaty.” There are numerous shorthand labels around to refer to the this 
treaty including, Franco-German Cooperation Treaty, Franco-German Friendship Treaty, or simply Franco-
German Treaty. I will employ them interchangeably. For the history of the treaty and the circumstances under 
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Gaulle wanted to give permanence to the tremendously improved relations between France and Ger-
many. With the Treaty, they aimed at binding their respective successors to their goal of bilateral 
proximity. “The Treaty should help to achieve permanent concertation” between France and Ger-
many, de Murville reflects.7  It “should become the basis of our relations.”8 At its thirtieth anniver-
sary it was called “treaty of the century”9 and “a foundation for Europe.”10  Others have called it “the 
Magna Charta of Franco-German relations.”11 The Elysée Treaty organizes and formulates the basic 
principles of the regularized bilateral intergovernmentalism between France and Germany. 
 
The Elysée Treaty marks both an end and a beginning. On the one hand it “crowned”12 the 
period of reconciliation between France and Germany, now commonly dated 1945-1963. Ultimately 
and irrevocably, it ends the times of Franco-German “hereditary enmity” – the common way of re-
ferring to Franco-German relations between 1871 and 1945. The Treaty, co-signatory de Murville ex-
plicates, “solemnly sealed Franco-German reconciliation. Forever. From then on, the enmity between 
the two peoples, which took shape in the nineteenth century and culminated in the twentieth century 
with two huge bloody wars, and which had been considered insurmountable, belonged to the past.”13 
 
On the other hand, the Elysée Treaty also brands the beginning of a time of increasingly 
tightly institutionalized constructive Franco-German relations. The Treaty commences a historical 
period in which it became commonplace to refer to France and Germany together with terms such as 
“couple,” “tandem,” “pair,” “entente,” “partners,” and several others. Both chancellor and president, 
who were in 1963 eighty-seven and seventy-three years old respectively, were affected by their sign-
ing of the Treaty. After they had put down their pens, they hugged each other and completed the 
conclusion of this international treaty with a fraternal kiss. 
 
Contents of the Treaty 
 
The Franco-German Cooperation Treaty comprises two main parts. A short third part, 
“Final Provisions,” concludes the Treaty, and the brief “Common Declaration” of President de 
Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer precedes it.14  In this declaration, president and chancellor underline 
the Treaty’s historic character.15 They stress their “conviction” that the reconciliation between the 
French and German peoples that “ends a centuries old rivalry constitutes a historic event that funda-
mentally redefines the relationship between the two peoples with one another.”16 
 
The Treaty’s first part, titled “Organization,” outlines in succinct and “very strict”17 stipu-
lations the general “mechanisms” of Franco-German interaction.18  Its Section One formulates that 
the heads of state and government generally should oversee the Treaty’s regulations and give the di-
                                                                                                                                              
which it became formulated and signed, see Abelein 1963; Ecker-Ertle 1998, 122; Fischer 1992; Schwarz 1991; 
Sverdrup 1994, chapter 3; Ziebura 1978a. Treaty co-signatory Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder is neither 
identical to nor related with the later German chancellor with the same name. All translations from French and 
German into English in this paper are my own. 
7 de Murville 1988, 170. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Fischer 1992. 
10 Kohl 1992. 
11 Koenig 1997, 70. 
12 de Murville 1988, 174. 
13 Ibid., 170. 
14 The full Treaty is reprinted, for example, in Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut 
Ludwigsburg 1993, 136-145; Ménudier 1993, 85-89. 
15 See Ménudier 1993, 80. 
16 Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 136-137. 
17 Guldner 1989, 136. 
18 Ménudier 1993, 80. 
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rections necessary for that purpose. To that end, those officials meet as often as necessary, but at 
least twice a year. 
 
The second section assigns to the foreign ministers the responsibility for the Treaty’s appli-
cation and implementation in its entirety. For that purpose, the ministers meet at least every three 
months. The section further stipulates that high-ranking diplomats from the two ministries respon-
sible for political, economic, and cultural affairs meet every month. Finally, the section specifies that 
embassies and consulates, as well as French and German missions to international organizations, 
should be in contact with one another on all matters of common interest. 
 
The provisions of the third section of Part One indicate that the French and German de-
fense ministers should meet at least every three months and the heads of the general staffs at least 
every two months. The German minister for family youth affairs is required to meet at least every 
two months with the French high commissioner for these policy areas. 
 
Section Four, finally, institutes a French and a German interministerial commission to pro-
vide coherence to Franco-German cooperation, and to provide suggestions for the extension of 
Franco-German cooperation into new areas. 
 
The Treaty’s second main part, comprising three major sections numbered A, B, and C, 
bears the heading “Program.” Section A concerns foreign affairs. It formulates that the “the two gov-
ernments consult each other before every important decision in all important questions of foreign 
policy, in particular in questions of joint interest, in order to arrive as much as possible at common 
positions.”19 Legal scholar Martin Sattler views this regulation as the “kernel” of the Treaty and the 
“consultation duty” the central Treaty arrangement.20 “Consultation,” he analyzes the term from an 
international legal point of view, “is joint deliberation among the foreign organs of two or more 
states with the purpose to alleviate or to dissolve disagreements among those involved in the con-
sultation, or in order to define a common position of the organs consulting with one another with 
respect to third states.”21 
 
Section B defines Franco-German cooperation objectives in the policy areas of defense, se-
curity, and armament. It stipulates that in the areas of strategy and tactics, “the respective entities of 
the two states will strive to reconcile their positions in order to arrive at common conceptions.”22  It 
designates the creation of Franco-German institutes for operative research and the exchange among 
personnel of the French and German armed forces. Finally, it formulates that both governments will 
endeavor to realize joint armament projects and to work out the financing of such projects. 
 
Section C defines Franco-German cooperation in the areas of education and youth affairs. 
The section formulates that France and Germany will aim at improving the study of the respective 
other language and that Franco-German scientific exchanges will be intensified. Finally, it announces 
the creation of a Franco-German youth organization that will strengthen the existing ties between 
young French and Germans, to increase mutual understanding between them and to extend ex-
changes among French and German youth groups. 
 
The Treaty’s short Part Three, “Final Provisions,” defines the Treaty’s “application modali-
ties.”23 It states that in both countries “the necessary steps for an immediate realization” of the 
                                                
19 Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 140-141. 
20 Sattler 1976, 92. 
21 Ibid. For a legal-theoretical discussion of the term “common interest,” according to Sattler the second main 
legal term of this section, see ibid., 93-94. 
22 Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 140-141. 
23 Guldner 1989, 138. 
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Treaty “will be taken instantaneously.” The two states’ foreign ministers are to evaluate at each of 
their meetings how much progress has been made in the realization of the Treaty’s contents.24 
 
Especially in foreign and security affairs, the Elysée Treaty defines processes. It structures 
procedures of interaction to bring about a varied range of specific substantive outcomes over an un-
specified time period. Whereas the Treaty formulates its goals in general terms, it leaves the concrete 
substantive results to be generated by the interaction processes it puts into place. Especially concern-
ing cooperation in foreign policy, the Elysée Treaty is not a treaty of substance, but a treaty of pro-
cedure.25 
 
Extensions, Additions, Intensifications 
 
Since 1963, France and Germany have extended and intensified their regularized intergov-
ernmentalism based on the Elysée Treaty’s original regulations in three ways. First, they widely ex-
tended the magnitude of the semiannual “summit consultations” around the regularized meetings 
among the heads of state and government on the basis of the Treaty. These summits, initially taking 
place among chancellor, president, prime minister and a handful of ministers, have grown enor-
mously over time. By the 1980s they included almost all ministers as well as civil servants from all 
ranks. Second, they added a number of protocols and letters or notes to the 1963 Franco-German 
Cooperation Treaty that extended and complemented bilateral Franco-German regularized intergov-
ernmentalism. On the one hand, this action formally broadened Franco-German bilateralism to pol-
icy areas that the 1963 stipulations did not explicitly mention. On the other hand, it intensified regu-
larized interaction between France and Germany in policy areas that the Elysée Treaty had covered. 
Third, new instruments, most notably the institution of positions of general commissioners for 
Franco-German cooperation in 1967, aimed to strengthen and enhance the coherence and sturdiness 
of the regularized Franco-German processes that the Elysée Treaty had originally defined. I will take 
these extensions, additions, and intensifications in turn. 
 
The Franco-German summit consultations have widely extended and intensified since the 
first meetings in July 1963, following the signing of the Elysée Treaty.26  In the first years after the 
Elysée Treaty, a Franco-German summit meeting was often made up of chancellor, president, and 
prime minister, and only three or four other ministers, together with their respective staff members.27 
Since the twenty-fourth consultations of 8-9 July 1974, the ministers of interior affairs have regularly 
participated in the consultations.28 During the 1970s, between twelve and eighteen ministers normally 
participated.29 By the second half of the 1980s, almost all members of the French and German 
governments were participating in the bilateral summit meetings.30 
 
Since the 1970s, Franco-German consultations have comprised interaction and communi-
cation on almost all governmental levels. The head of state and heads of governments bring, in ad-
                                                
24 Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 144-145. For analyses of 
the Elysée Treaty from different angles from which I have drawn in this summary, see Guldner 1989; Koenig 
1997; Ménudier 1993; Menyesch and Uterwedde 1978; Sattler 1976. 
25 Many observers overlook the important distinction between international treaties on processes and those on 
outcomes. Others remark only in passing upon this significant characteristic of the Elysée Treaty that is argu-
ably the key to its perseverance and tenacity. Stephen Kocs is aware of the distinction. See Kocs 1995, 42-43. 
26 For a complete listing of all Franco-German summit consultations, their locations and dates, as well as the 
participating key political personnel and the major political topics discussed at each, see Deutsch-Französisches 
Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after). 
27 Morizet 1988, 197. 
28 Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 44. For an impression 
of how much the summit’s consultations have grown by the mid-1970s, see, for example, the list of participants 
at the twenty-fifth summit on 3-4 February 1975. Ibid., 45. 
29 Sverdrup 1994, 93. 
30 Ibid. 
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dition to their personal staff, their ministers, accompanied by their ministres délegués, Staatssekretäre and 
Abteilungleiter. For much of the work on details across the entire range of policy domains, they in turn 
bring public servants from lower hierarchical levels as part of the delegations. It has become com-
mon for between 100 and 150 public officials from each country to participate in summit meetings. 
Twenty-five years after the conclusion of the Treaty, the number of ministers participating and the 
sheer size of the delegations had grown to a degree that led Le Monde commentator Henri de Bresson 
to suggest that it might be most appropriate to speak by now of a common Franco-German Council 
of Ministers.31  The exact number of participants differs from summit to summit. However, at the 
Treaty’s thirty-fifth anniversary a number of 150 “advisors, spokespersons, state secretaries, and di-
verse other official(s)” per state make up the “impressive caravan” of the machinery of a Franco-
German summit.32 
 
The addition of four Franco-German Councils to the original regulations of the Elysée 
Treaty in the late1980s constitutes the second kind of extension and intensification of the regularized 
bilateral Franco-German intergovernmentalism over the past four decades. The regulations establish-
ing two of these councils, the Franco-German Council for Defense and Security and the Franco-
German Council for Economics and Finance, both of 1988, were added as protocols to the original 
Treaty text. They so became an integral part of the Elysée Treaty.33  The Franco-German Cultural 
Council (1988) and the Council for the Environment (1989) were created by the exchange of notes 
between the French and German foreign ministers in 1988 and 1989 respectively. These two councils 
enjoy a less formalized status than the former two.34  These institutional extensions aim at “increas-
ingly condensing communality” in all of these policy areas.35 I will take a closer look at these councils 
in the subsequent section on Franco-German regularized intergovernmentalism across policy areas. 
 
The institution of special public positions with respect to Franco-German affairs in either or 
both countries, particularly the inauguration of overall “coordinators” for Franco-German coopera-
tion, marks the third kind of addendum to the Elysée Treaty. Until 1967, a high-ranking diplomat 
from the foreign ministry headed the interministerial commission for Franco-German cooperation in 
each of the two states. In July 1967, the special position of a “coordinator” of Franco-German co-
operation in both France and Germany was introduced to head the respective interministerial com-
missions for Franco-German affairs.36 The French president and German chancellor appointed 
Pierre-Olivier Lapie and Manfred Klaiber as the first two coordinators. From November 1969 on, 
the close-to-legendary Carlo Schmid filled the position on the German side.37 
 
The French and German coordinators of Franco-German cooperation regularly report to 
the two governments on the state of affairs of the bilateral cooperation. Additionally, they are asked 
“to develop further cooperation and to submit suggestions for its extension to other areas” as well as 
                                                
31 de Bresson 1988, 4-5. 
32 Audibert 1998. The total numbers of the participants of the seventy-second consultation were about 180 for 
Germany and 250 for France. 
33 Bohle 1988. See also Bremer 1988, 24, 34-36. 
34 See Bohle 1988. See also Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 
160-167. 
35 Bohle 1988. 
36 Menyesch and Uterwedde 1978, 34. The official name of the German position is Koordinator für die deutsch-
französische Zusammenarbeit. The name for the French position is Président de la Commission Interminisérielle pour les 
questions de coopération entre la France et la Republique Féderale d’Allemagne. See also Guérin-Sendelbach 1993, 26; 
Kaltenbach 1983b, 9; Ménudier 1982, 158.  
37 Menyesch and Uterwedde 1978, 34. 
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to point out ways to improve cohesion and efficacy of the overall bilateral cooperation.38  They 
regularly participate in the semiannual summit meetings. 
 
From the beginning, the coordinators of Franco-German cooperation have been respected 
personalities who could speak with authority and personal independence from their administrations.39 
They already had proven their abilities with achievements in various other positions. The coordinator 
position has been filled with persons who already had their careers behind them and could focus 
exclusively on the work at hand.40 
 
Another similar intensification in the cultural realm is the institution of a commissioner for 
cultural affairs, the Bevollmächtigte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für kulturelle Angelegenheiten. Since the 
German Länder dominate in the cultural area, the function is fulfilled by one of the minister presi-
dents of a German Land for a four-year term. The Bevollmächtigte or “Kulturbeauftragte” is in regular 
contact with the French ministers for education and culture. In conjunction with the cultural division 
of the German foreign ministry, the Bevollmächtigte, together with the two French ministers, develop 
Franco-German cooperation projects in the areas of culture and education.41 
 
Semiannual Summit Meetings 
 
Around the regularized semiannual meetings between the German chancellor, French 
president, and French prime minister grew the regularized “Franco-German summit consultations.”42 
Some have described them as something between international cooperation and joint Franco-
German cabinet meetings.43  These consultations, long time commentator on Franco-German affairs 
Günther Nonnenmacher looks back, “by now have their own tradition.”44  They are the most visible 
sign of the Elysée Treaty in practice. 
 
                                                
38 Ménudier 1982, 158. See also, Menyesch and Uterwedde 1978, 34. The suggestion to institute a Franco-
German Environmental Council, for example, came first from the two coordinators for Franco-German rela-
tions. See Stuttgarter Zeitung, 9 December 1995, 3. 
39 Menyesch and Uterwedde 1978, 34. 
40 André Bord, for example, who headed the French interministerial commission during the 1980s, was a first-
generation reconciler and a twice decorated Second World War veteran who had fought in the legendary 
Alsace-Lorraine French resistance brigade. Paterson and Moutet 1995. Among other former office holders are 
Gerhard Stoltenberg (until 1995) and Manfred Rommel (1995-1999), public figure and former mayor of Stutt-
gart. Since 1999 Rudolf von Thadden, a history professor emeritus at Göttingen University, and acknowledged 
expert on Franco-German affairs has headed the German commission for Franco-German affairs. The Ger-
man chancellor and French president, as Kohl and Chirac in the case of Rommel, have often discussed with 
one another their respective appointments in order to find personalities that both French and German political 
leaders consider most qualified for the positions. Stuttgarter Zeitung, 27 October 1995. 
41 See, for example, Bock 1989, 159. Erwin Teufel, for example, Minister President of Baden-Würtemberg, 
succeeded Oskar Lafontaine, then Minister President of the Saarland, in 1996. 
42 Policy-makers, journalists, and academics refer to the regular Franco-German consultations with various 
names, including  “summit meetings,” “Franco-German summits,” and “Franco-German consultations” 
(sommet franco-allemand, Deutsch-Französischer Gipfel; Deutsch-Französische Gipfelgespräche, and so forth). Easily recog-
nizable as synonyms, I use them interchangeably. The regular consultations are evidently “summits” in the 
sense that the German chancellor and the French president and prime minister participate and preside the con-
sultations. They are “summits” given that often as many twenty or more top politicians of the rank of a minis-
ter participate for France and Germany and confer with their colleagues form the other state. However, I em-
ploy ”summit” in the awareness that these consultations frequently include many more than a hundred public 
officials from each France and Germany. “Summit” here does not imply that the phenomena of Franco-
German consultations were limited to the political top layers. 
43 See, for example, Sverdrup 1994, 102 and 125. 
44 Nonnenmacher 1997. For an overview of the historical evolution of Franco-German summit consultations 
that pays special attention to the respective governments in power, see Bremer 1988. 
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Franco-German summits are usually scheduled for late April, May, or early June (“spring 
summit”), and for late November or early December (“winter summit”). Until the twenty-sixth 
summit in 1975, the consultations took place alternately in Paris and Bonn.45 From then on, numer-
ous other French and German towns have hosted summit consultations. 
 
Some summits are titled to describe the focus of their proceedings. The thirty-seventh con-
sultations of 5-6 June 1981, the forty-eighth summit of 27-28 October in Frankfurt, and the seven-
tieth summit of 18-19 September 1997 in Weimar, for example, were labeled “cultural summits,” 
because they particularly focused on Franco-German cultural relations.46 Other summits have 
focused on security issues or issues of European politics and European integration. 
 
Preparations and follow-ups to the summit meetings, in various policy areas, often take place 
almost perpetually on the lower hierarchical “working” or “operational levels.” This stretches from 
the level of political directors, many of whom meet on a regularized monthly basis, all the way down 
to civil servants within the German Referate and the French bureaux. However, even the two states’ 
foreign ministers have met to prepare for Franco-German summit consultations.47  And it has hap-
pened that the German chancellor and the French president have met on short notice in order to dis-
cuss a topic that they deemed particularly important in preparation for the upcoming regularly sche-
duled summit. Furthermore, there often are “informal continuations” of summit consultations on 
various hierarchical levels. 
 
However, about two months before a summit, the two governments inquire about the spe-
cific questions and subjects to be dealt with during the next summit meeting. The various ministries 
suggest political questions and issues. On the German side, these topics are discussed subsequently in 
the interministerial commission. Issues are only fixed after the list has been approved by the chan-
cellor.48  On the French side, the general secretary of the Elysée oversees and is generally responsible 
for the French preparations for summit meetings.49  Several officials of the Elysée assist him. They 
also establish, depending on the policy issue, the contacts with the respective ministries, most notably 
the ministry of foreign affairs. Then the interministerial commission for Franco-German affairs 
meets and prepares for the issues that will be the subjects of the upcoming summit. The coordinator 
for Franco-German affairs is involved in these procedures and becomes active particularly on issues 
relating to education and culture.50 
 
After various Franco-German exchanges, about two weeks prior to the consultations, the list 
that includes the issues to be discussed by the single ministries arrives at the respective foreign minis-
tries. The foreign ministers coordinate the contributions of the various ministers and their ministries 
and review the general positions that France and Germany will take on a given issue.51  These lists 
constitute the basis on which the upcoming consultations will take place.52 
 
                                                
45 The fifth Franco-German summit, which took place in Rambouillet on 19-20 January 1965, was an excep-
tion. The summits carry their number in the title to which one refers to them. In the numbering of the Franco-
German summit consultations, I stick with the counting that takes the meeting in Bonn on 4-5 July 1963 as the 
first Franco-German summit. In a few older documents, the French counting initially diverged from the 
German one, as it counted the conclusion of the Elysée Treaty already as the first Franco-German summit, so 
that the meeting of 4-5 July 1963 numbered as the second Franco-German summit consultations. The 
numbering that does not include the conclusion of the Elysée Treaty itself now has become standard practice. 
46 See Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after). 
47 In late November 1998, for example, Foreign Ministers Fischer and Védrine met in preparation for the sum-
mit consultations of 30 November and 1 December in Potsdam. 
48 Kaltenbach 1983a, 25. 
49 Lequesne 1990, 139. 
50 Ibid. 140. For specifics of French preparations, see ibid., 140-141. 
51 Kaltenbach 1983a, 25. 
52 Ibid. 
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Most Franco-German summits follow a largely standardized scheme. They begin on the af-
ternoon of the first day with consultations between the French president and the German chancellor, 
followed by the prime minister and chancellor. Parallel to these meetings on the highest political 
levels, French and German ministers in the same policy domain lead their consultations, as do vari-
ous other parts of the two delegations on different hierarchical levels. The first day of consultations 
ends with a dinner that includes a limited number of ministers in addition to president, prime minis-
ter, and chancellor.53  The toasts usually given by either president or chancellor at this occasion often 
recapitulate the state of affairs of Franco-German dealings and locate them within the major political 
issues of the time. They further touch on the major themes of the ongoing summit consultations. 
 
On the following morning the consultations among ministers and other parts of the dele-
gations continue. Traditionally, the two foreign ministers have breakfast together.54  The French and 
German heads of state and government meet a second time for sessions. After that the German 
foreign minister, who is at the same time vice chancellor, meets the French prime minister.55  Simul-
taneously, consultations at the other governmental and administrative levels continue. After the indi-
vidual ministers have communicated the results of their respective talks to their heads of state and 
government, there follows a plenary session in which the French president and the German chan-
cellor jointly summarize the results of the summit meetings. Then follows a press conference over 
which president and chancellor jointly preside. The summit consultations often end with a joint 
lunch at the respective French or German embassy in which the two entire delegations, president, 
chancellor, and prime minister participate.56 
 
Franco-German summits usually end with a list of joint Franco-German declarations and 
communiqués. They are jointly pronounced either by president and chancellor, or by the respective 
ministers. The councils frequently issue their own statements. These various declarations will subse-
quently be published by the official French and German information sources and are issued to the 
various press agencies and journalists following the summits. 
 
Franco-German summit consultations often are both beginnings and ends. At one summit, 
president, chancellor, and prime minister might identify a certain political issue, or their ministers will 
bring a particularly difficult political matter to their attention. They might first discuss the issue in its 
broad implications and decide to set up Franco-German working groups in order to work out the 
details that will allow the arrival at common positions or the finding of solutions to the problems. 57 
At the next or a later summit, they will review and discuss the working groups’ results and either use 
them as a basis on which to take decisions on the matter, or again delegate to their ministers or a 
Franco-German body for further consideration. 
 
Beyond and Below 
 
The Elysée Treaty is the main frame of regularized bilateral Franco-German intergovern-
mentalism, but not its exclusive setting. France and Germany are additionally tied by regularized con-
tacts beyond and below the stipulations of the Elysée Treaty and its extensions. “Beyond” here refers 
                                                
53 Ibid., 26. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Since the late 1980s, the Franco-German Council for Defense and Security, the Economic and Finance 
Council, and the Council for the Environment have met as part of the summit as well with their respective mix 
of participants. 
56 In this summary I have mainly drawn on Kaltenbach 1983a. See also Kaltenbach 1983b; Lequesne 1990. 
57 The seventy-second Franco-German summit in Potsdam, for example, saw the institution of two Franco-
German working groups. The first one dealt with the Franco-German consequences of the new German gov-
ernment’s retreat from producing electricity in nuclear power plants. To the second one, to be headed by the 
two states’ foreign ministers, the heads of state and government delegated the task of working out suggestions 
on refreshing and improving the bilateral relationship. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 December 1998, 1-2. 
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to one of two types of interactions: either regularized contacts that take place outside of Treaty stipu-
lations but in policy areas mentioned in the Treaty, or regular interaction on high political levels in 
policy areas that the Treaty does not explicitly include. Regularized intergovernmentalism “below” re-
fers to recurrent Franco-German interaction across policy domains that takes place on governmental 
levels that the Elysée Treaty does not mention. For both I will sketch a few representative examples; 
they are not an exhaustive review. 
 
Among the regularized intergovernmentalism between France and Germany beyond the 
regulations of the Elysée Treaty, I will name only three examples: “informal meetings” and contacts; 
joint trips by French and German public officials; and ongoing projects of Franco-German cooper-
ation in embassies and consulates. 
 
Several observers have noted the increased interaction among French and German heads of 
state and governments as well as ministers since the 1970s. Such interactions, which often come un-
der the now standard label of “quick informal meetings [infromelle Kurztreffen],” concern important 
matters of daily politics, or they serve to prepare for or follow up from summits. Because such in-
formal contacts, sometimes declared private meetings, are often not recorded in the ministries, chan-
cellor’s office, or administration of the Elysée, different scholars’ estimates of their frequency differ 
somewhat. Veteran analyst of Franco-German dealings Gilbert Ziebura counts about eighty official 
and unofficial meetings between Kohl and Mitterrand between late 1982 and 1989.58  Another form 
of such “informal contacts” are telephone calls. Ziebura estimates that Foreign Ministers Hans-
Dietrich Genscher and Claude Cheysson, who had helped in working out the Franco-German treaty 
some two decades earlier in his career, had talked on the telephone with each other about one thou-
sand times between 1982 and 1984.59 
 
Another form of public Franco-German contacts is joint travel, especially by the heads of 
state and governments, foreign ministers, and defense ministers. In 1997, for example, the French 
and German foreign ministries decided to facilitate the coordination of French and German foreign 
policies and to mirror Franco-German determination to act in concert more broadly, with common 
trips by the French and German foreign ministers to third countries. Foreign Ministers Hubert Vé-
drine and Klaus Kinkel announced the agreement to extend the practice on 3 July 1997. Subse-
quently, the two ministers traveled together to Sarajevo in December 1997 and to Zagreb and 
Belgrade in March 1998.60 
 
A third type of regularized intergovernmentalism between France and Germany beyond the 
Treaty concerns ongoing projects to further coordinate French and German diplomatic work. The 
project of creating joint Franco-German embassies and common ambassadors dates back to the 
1980s.61  France and Germany continued the tradition during the 1990s. 62  A French and a German 
diplomat would alternate in heading such common embassies; the regular work would be divided 
between French and German diplomatic staff.63  Such projects, however, have proven difficult to 
                                                
58 Ziebura 1997, 328-329. In an informal meeting among French and German heads of state and government as 
well as foreign ministers in Blaesheim near Strasbourg in late January 2002, the French and German political 
leadership decided that the French president, prime minister, and German chancellor were henceforth to gather 
for informal meetings every 6-8 weeks, and the French and German foreign ministers every four weeks. 
59 Ibid. With Cheysson’s successor, Roland Dumas, Genscher himself reports of extended telephone conversa-
tions “several times a week.” Genscher 1995, 215. On “informal contacts” see further Guérin-Sendelbach 
1993, 25. In a review of Franco-German relations of the 1980s, Udo Kempf distinguishes among official bi-
lateral meetings, unofficial bilateral meetings, Franco-German meetings within a multilateral context, and bi-
lateral symbolic meetings. Kempf 1987, 34. 
60 See Froehly 1998, 28. 
61 See, for example, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 October 1988, 10. 
62 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 December 1998, 2. 
63 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 October 1988, 10. 
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realize, not so much for internal Franco-German reasons, but ones relating to the implications of 
such a step for international law and diplomacy. In the second half of the 1990s, however, France 
and Germany agreed to increasingly use each other’s embassies.64 
 
Franco-German regularized interaction below the Elysée Treaty comprises a varied set of 
practices. Perhaps key among them are increased exchanges of diplomats and other civil servants.65 
These exchanges exist in different versions. France and Germany had regularly exchanged officials 
for a while when, after the 1987 summit in Karlsruhe, such Franco-German exchanges entered a 
second phase marked by the extension of such practices.66  For example, French civil servants would 
intern in the German Federal administration, including the ministry for foreign affairs, and Germans 
would work for extended periods in the French national administration. 
 
From the late 1980s on, such exchanges reached another level. Now a French diplomat 
would take a regular post in the German foreign ministry and a German diplomat at the Quai d’Or-
say for a year, working together with new colleagues irrespective of passport. Thus, a German would 
officially speak for France, or a French diplomat negotiate internationally for Germany as part of the 
program. Michel Connan, for example, the first French diplomat to regularly work a year at the Ger-
man foreign ministry, traveled with his colleagues of the German delegation to Vienna, where he 
officially spoke for Germany and expressed German positions at the CSCE.67 
 
In 1997, French and German Foreign Ministers Védrine and Kinkel further extended the ex-
changes between civil servants and diplomats, as they considered the experiences of the preceding 
decade a success. Beginning in the late 1990s, a high-ranking French diplomat has worked at the Ger-
man embassy in Paris and a German at the French embassies in Bonn and Berlin.68  By then it had 
also become standard practice for high-ranking diplomats of the respective embassies to participate 
in working sessions of the other state’s ministries.69  By the 1990s, the “exchanges of diplomats and 
officers have become routine.”70 
                                                
64 Germany, for example, will use the French embassy on the Capverdian Islands. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
5 July 1997, 2. For a list of further Franco-German cooperation beyond the Elysée Treaty, see Menyesch and 
Uterwedde 1978, 38. 
65 Guido Hartmann distinguishes among three hierarchical levels of Franco-German interaction: (1) The upper 
ministerial leadership level, comprising ministers and Staatssekretäre in the German case, and ministers and state 
secretaries (ministres d’Etat, ministres délégués, and secretaires d’Etat) as well as the leading personnel of the minis-
terial cabinets (directeur de cabinet and chef de cabinet) in the French case; (2) the intermediate ministerial leadership 
levels: heads of division or subdivisions (Abteilungen or Unterabteilungen in Germany, headed usually by civil ser-
vants of the rank Ministerialdirektor, and Ministerialrat or Ministeraildirigent) for Germany, and the heads of the 
French direction générale and  directions; and (3) and the cooperation on the level of the German Referate and the 
French the subunits or divisions within the respective direction (depending on size and ministerial department 
with different denominations: sous-direction, service, division, section, cellule, bureau) as well as subsidiary and special 
services. See Hartmann , 46-56 and 89-97. The third of Hartmann’s levels is commonly called the “working 
level” or “operational level (niveau opérationnel).” See, for example, Leimbacher 1992b, 233. “Below” here refers 
to all levels below those mentioned by the Elysée Treaty and its additions. 
66 Grosser 1988. 
67 Rosenzweig 1988. Connan pointed out after his year-long tenure as a German diplomat that getting to the 
German decision circuits and working methods from an inside perspective facilitated his subsequent involve-
ment in Franco-German affairs thereafter. See ibid. 
68 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 July 1997, 2. 
69 Froehly 1998, 28. 
70 Leimbacher 1992b. Unlike in other policy areas, in defense and military the Elysée Treaty explicitly mention-
ed Franco-German exchanges and joint programs below the levels of ministers and high-ranking officials as 
part of the Franco-German cooperation. The contacts, programs, and projects between the armed forces of the 
two states comprised a large number of wide ranging activities. Especially since the late 1960s, Franco-German 
military cooperation has been tightened. In 1967,Generals Massu and de Maizière signed a partnership treaty 
between the First French and Fifth German tank divisions. Within that cooperation, for example, French and 
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An example of Franco-German intergovernmentalism below the Treaty, other than ex-
change of diplomats and personnel, are joint Franco-German conferences among the ambassadors of 
the two states. The first “Franco-German ambassadors’ conference” took place on 16-17 May 1991 
in Weimar. The French and German ambassadors concentrated on issues pertaining to political and 
economic development in Central and Eastern Europe, and discussed the possibilities for common 
Franco-German support for the reform processes of the states in this region.71  These types of con-
ferences typically focus on a specific theme or political issue area, where common French and Ger-
man views or positions are deemed to be particularly important. The 1998 ambassadors’ conference, 
for example, was organized to deal with transatlantic relations.72 
 
In sum, the Elysée Treaty, along with its extensions, additions, and intensifications, defines 
regularized intergovernmental processes. These are reiterated practices of representatives of the 
French and German states. Beyond and below the Elysée Treaty, additional regularized intergovern-
mentalism enhances the provisions of the Treaty. 
 
French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, in a speech delivered in the presence of Foreign 
Minister Genscher right before the fifty-third Franco-German summit in April 1989, after the two 
ministers had exchanged the ratification documents on the creation of the Franco-German Security 
and Economics Councils, gives a telling insight about the intensity that the regularized Franco-
German intergovernmentalism had reached by the 1980s, both within the confines of the Elysée 
Treaty as well as beyond: 
 
In less than three hours the 53rd Franco-German consultations under the supervision of 
Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand will begin. Twenty-five ministers will 
simultaneously lead bilateral discussions. We, Mister Vice Chancellor, will begin a little 
bit earlier; right after this event we will begin our talks. I better should say that we will 
continue our talks, because we have met three days ago in Grenada and two weeks ago 
in Bonn. And the President has met the Chancellor only a few days ago in Bavaria. I 
depict that in such detail because I want to underline that between Bonn and Paris a 
permanent dialogue has developed. And that has happened on all levels of government 
and across all issues: strengthening of the solidarity in the area of security, bilateral 
cooperation, youth exchange, joint conduct in the construction of Europe.73 
 
II. Regularized Intergovernmentalism across Policy Areas 
 
This section cuts horizontally across regularized Franco-German intergovernmentalism in 
the major policy areas. Where pertinent, it also considers developments of bilateral institutionali-
                                                                                                                                              
German units participate in maneuvers of the respective other division. See Bundesministerium der Verteidi-
gung (German Ministry of Defense) 1988, 139. Ever since, partnerships between many French and German 
military units have spread way below the level of divisions. They also comprise partnerships among barracks. 
Joint training programs of a most varied kind have expanded enormously. In 1993, for example, the navies of 
the two states introduced an exchange training program among officers. Within that program one or two offi-
cers are fully trained in the navy of the respective other. See Presse- und Informationsabteilung der Fran-
zösischen Botschaft 1998. The first joint Franco-German seminar for military officers, to name one more ex-
ample, took place at the Center for Higher Military Studies (CHEM) in Paris  between 6 and 11 July 1987. Koe-
nig 1997, 73. Franco-German military cooperation also comprises numerous major and minor joint maneuvers. 
See Filser 1996, 31-33. Finally, among the most visible elements of Franco-German military cooperation is the 
Franco-German Brigade, later extended to the “Eurocorps.” See especially Klein 1990. See further Filser 1996, 
33-36 and 71-76. For other aspects of Franco-German defense cooperation, see several contributions to Pirotte 
1997b. 
71 Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 109. 
72 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 July 1995, 2. 
73 Dumas 1989, D 461. 
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zation across time in the respective policy domains. This section further pays attention to the hier-
archical levels on which regularized contacts are institutionalized. 
 
Typically, the respective ministers oversee Franco-German interaction in their policy areas. 
However, the French president as head of state, and the German chancellor and French prime 
minister as heads of government, can and do get involved in the various policy fields. In security, de-
fense, and armament, they are institutionally involved ex officio. In these policy areas, but also in 
others, they may focus on particular political issues that they consider of special relevance. 
 
Frequently, if the respective ministers, or the French and German politicians or civil servants 
at lower hierarchical levels, have difficulty working out joint Franco-German positions or are unable 
to settle solutions to a problem, they will move the matter up to the level of heads of state and gov-
ernment. Alternatively, the president, chancellor, and prime minister themselves will take the matter 
up in order to deal with it on the highest political levels. They then may outline a framework to deal 
with the issue and again push it down to ministerial levels or further. Or they may introduce a new 
initiative by themselves, sketch it in its rudiments, and delegate it for further concretization to their 
ministers. The French and German heads of state and government may initiate or define basic blue-
prints; and they later review their substantiation before they adopt a respective project as policy. This 
switching of hierarchy levels in order to arrive at common positions, particularly on difficult issues, 
can often be observed as a feature of the regularized Franco-German bilateralism. 
 
Security, Defense, Armament 
 
Foreign and security policy lay at the core of the Elysée Treaty. It was also in these areas in 
which the two states supplemented the original treaty text most extensively.74  France and Germany 
twice significantly extended their institutional bilateral intergovernmentalism in security, defense, and 
armament based on the stipulations of the Elysée Treaty. In 1982 France and Germany founded the 
permanent Franco-German Security and Defense Commission. In 1988, they significantly extended 
and integrated this commission into a comprehensive Franco-German Defense and Security Coun-
cil.75 
 
France and Germany carried out the first major extension and addition of the Elysée Treaty 
in 1982, when they instituted the Franco-German Commission for Security and Defense. During the 
39th Franco-German summit on 25 February 1982, François Mitterrand and Helmut Schmidt agreed 
to intensify Franco-German interaction in security matters. Schmidt’s successor Kohl, after his elec-
tion in October 1982, continued the project. On the eve of the fortieth Franco-German summit in 
October 1982, the French and German defense and foreign ministers met for the first time in a joint 
session. A high ranking civil servant from each of the four ministries accompanied the four minis-
ters.76 
 
During the summit, Kohl and Mitterrand decided to regularize these meetings and make 
them part of the semiannual Franco-German summits. Further, they decided to institute a permanent 
                                                
74 There is a huge body of literature on Franco-German security relations at large. Important publications in-
clude Baums 1992; Gnesotto 1986; Gordon 1994; Gordon 1995; Haglund 1991; Hornung 1996; Kaiser and 
Lellouche 1986; Kocs 1995; Laird 1989; Leimbacher 1992a; Manfrass-Sirjacques 1993; Presse- und Infor-
mationsamt der Bundesregierung. Referat Außen-  Sicherheits- und Europapolitik 1997; Schild 1997; Schmidt 
1993; Simonian 1985. 
75 For general reviews of Franco-German cooperation in security, defense, and armament, published at the oc-
casion of the Elysée Treaty’s twenty-fifth and thirtieth anniversaries, see Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 
(German Ministry of Defense) 1988; Secrétariat du Conseil Franco-Allemand de Défense et de Sécurité/ 
Sekretariat des Deutsch-Französischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrates 1993. 
76 On the German side they were the Staatssekretär for security politics of the Ministry of Defense and the Po-
litical Director of the Foreign Ministry. On the French side, the Political Director of the Foreign Ministry and 
the personal advisor of the Defense Minister. Leimbacher 1992a, 78. 
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“steering committee” that would prepare for the ministerial meetings. This Commission would be 
composed of the political directors of the four ministries as well as the German General Inspector of 
the Bundeswehr, the highest military position in the German forces, and the corresponding French of-
ficial, the chair of the French general staff. This group met for the first time on 7 December 1982 as 
the Franco-German Commission for Security and Defense. Finally, during the October 1982 summit, 
Kohl and Mitterrand, together with their foreign and defense ministers, decided to form three per-
manent Franco-German working groups that would support the work of the Security and Defense 
Commission in their regular meetings. The three working groups covered the areas “strategy and 
arms reduction,” bilateral “military cooperation” and “armament cooperation.” 77  In these working 
groups, the heads of the respective divisions (Abteilungleiter) of the respective French and German 
ministries deal with the main substantive issues of bilateral cooperation.78 
 
The Franco-German Commission for Security and Defense “constitutes the central forum 
for Franco-German cooperation in issues of security, defense, and armament. Vertically, it integrates 
the political and the bureaucratic levels in these policy fields. Horizontally, it connects the four 
foreign and defense ministries.”79 That some of the members of the permanent Commission also 
belong to one or more of the working groups increased the coherence of the bilateral dialogue. And 
the high-caliber staffing of the Commission ensured that political directives in the two states would 
be implemented.80 
 
For three years after 1983 when the Commission’s work was regularized, these channels en-
abled  intense bilateral exchanges for France and Germany to work on reconciling their positions in 
areas such as European security, East-West relations, and relations with the United States.81  With 
this Commission and the three working groups, diplomat Günther Koenig notes, France and Ger-
many established structures that provided for interaction, coordination, and harmonization leading to 
numerous initiatives in security and defense. They included a joint position on the NATO-two track 
decision, the development of a common combat helicopter of the second generation, a rejuvenation 
of the Western European Union, the institution of a “red telephone (heißer Draht)” between the 
Chancellor’s Office and the Elysée Palace, joint positions regarding CSCE and conventional arms 
control, rapprochement on the use of French pre-strategic arms, joint Franco-German workshops for 
officers, and major joint maneuvers beginning in October 1987.82 
 
The Franco-German Council for Defense and Security is the single most important institu-
tional addition to the Elysée Treaty.83  President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, Prime Minister Chirac, 
Foreign Ministers Raimond and Genscher, and Defense Ministers Giraud and Wörner signed the 
protocol that created it at the Elysée Treaty’s twenty-fifth anniversary on 22 January 1988.84 The 
French and German governments had decided to install such a council during the fiftieth Franco-
                                                
77 For details, see in particular Koenig 1997, 72-73;  and Leimbacher 1992a, 78-82. On the Franco-German 
Commission for Security and Defense and its working groups, see further Heisbourg 1986, 130-131; Millotat 
and Philippot 1990, 73-75. 
78 Leimbacher 1992a, 79. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 79-81. For details on each of the three working groups, see there. 
81 Morizet 1988, 198-199. 
82 Koenig 1997, 72-73. 
83 The Councils’ official names are Conseil Franco-Allemand de Défense et de Sécurité and Deutsch-Französischer 
Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrat. See Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 
1993, 150-151. 
84 For the complete text of the protocol, see Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut 
Ludwigsburg 1993, 150-155. For discussion of the Defense and Security Council’s stipulations and conse-
quences, see especially Koenig 1997, 73-85; Leimbacher 1992a, 174-180. See further, Bundesminister der 
Verteidigung. Informations- und Pressestab. Pressereferat 1989. 
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German summit Consultations in November 1987 in Karlsruhe.85  At the fifty-third summit in Paris 
in April 1989, French and German foreign ministers exchanged the ratification documents that made 
the protocol on the Defense and Security Council a part of the Elysée Treaty.86  As part of the sum-
mit consultations, the council concluded its first session on 20 April 1989 with a declaration jointly 
delivered by co-presidents Kohl and Mitterrand.87  They pronounced that the council strives to deep-
en the bilateral coordination and harmonization in all questions pertaining to defense and security, as 
well as intensifying Franco-German military cooperation.88 
 
The French president and prime minister, the German chancellor, and the foreign and de-
fense ministers of the two states, as well as the General Inspector of the Bundeswehr and the chair of 
the French General staff, compose the Franco-German Defense and Security Council. 
 
The Council Committee (Ratskomittee; Comité du Conseil) of the Defense and Security Council 
consists of the French and German foreign ministers and the two defense ministers. If appropriate, 
the political directors from these four ministries, the advisors to the German chancellor and French 
president, the General Inspector of the Bundeswehr, and the chair of the French general staff will par-
ticipate in the Council Committee’s meetings.89  The four ministers further can, on an ad hoc basis, 
appoint high civil servants and military leaders to support the work of the Council Committee.90 
Alternating between sites in France and Germany, the Council meets at least twice a year. The Coun-
cil Committee prepares the meetings of the Council with the support of the Franco-German Com-
mission for Defense and Security.91  Its main task is to develop the political bilateral issues to a de-
gree that they are ready for adoption during the meetings of the Defense and Security Council. The 
Council Committee meets shortly before the congregations of the Council itself.92 
 
Both the Defense and Security Council and the Council Committee oversee and will be sup-
ported by the Franco-German Defense and Security Commission, which is composed of high civil 
servants of the French and German foreign and defense ministries. The Commission meets at least 
twice a year, but can convene on an ad hoc basis depending on political or military circumstances. 
The Commission’s members include the political directors of the French and German foreign and 
defense ministries, the Bundeswehr’s General Inspector, the chair of the French general staff, and the 
French general armament delegate (DGA). That membership is complemented by high civil servants 
and military leaders, depending on the subject matter. The Commission reports on the implemen-
tation and working of the bilateral cooperation in defense, security, and armament, outlines per-
spectives for further cooperation, and formulates recommendations for such cooperation to the 
Defense and Security Council.93 
 
With the institution of the Franco-German Defense and Security Council, France and Ger-
many add to the Commission’s already existing working groups on “strategy and arms reduction,” 
bilateral “military cooperation,” and “armament cooperation,” three more bilateral working groups in 
these policy areas: one on “space-based reconnaissance,” one on “armament policies,” and one on 
                                                
85 Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 95. 
86 Ibid., 101. 
87 See ibid., 100. See also Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bulletin) 1989a, 314-315; Woyke 
1989, 168. 
88 Deutsch-Französischer Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrat 1989. 
89 See Koenig 1997, 74. See also Bremer 1988, 34-36. 
90 Article 2 of the protocol. See Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 
1993, 152-153. 
91 Article 3 of the protocol. See ibid. 
92 Koenig 1997, 74. 
93 Ibid., 75. 
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issues of “law and contracts.”94 The working group on “military cooperation” further institutes sub-
working groups on issues of Franco-German cooperation between the armies, navies, and air forces 
as well as on issues pertaining to all three of them and planning.95 
 
The protocol that creates the Franco-German Defense and Security Council further in-
stitutes a permanent Council secretariat with a seat in Paris.96  The secretariat has a permanent staff 
of high civil servants and high-ranking military officers of the four ministries. It both prepares and 
supports the work of the Council and the Council Committee; it connects the Council and the Coun-
cil Committee with the Defense and Security Commission; and it is concerned with the adminis-
trative work of Council, Council Committee, and their working relations with the Commission.97 
 
Article 4 of the protocol that creates the Defense and Security Council names six explicit 
goals for its work: to develop common conceptions in the area of defense and security; to assure the 
increasing coordination and harmonization of the positions of the two states on all issues that con-
cern European security; to take decisions regarding the institution of mixed military units; to take 
decisions regarding joint maneuvers and the joint training of military personnel, to strengthen the 
ability of both armed forces to support each other in peace as well as during crises and in case of war; 
to improve the interoperability of the two armed forces’ equipment; and to further develop and 
deepen armament cooperation.98 
 
The Franco-German Defense and Security Council is a “joint common coordination, con-
sultation, and decision organ on the highest political level.”99  After its sessions, the Defense and Se-
curity Council typically reports about its decisions in a joint press conference, usually including the 
French president and prime minister and the German chancellor. Subsequently, the Council pub-
lishes the results of its sessions in the official press of the two states.100  The Council’s formal legal 
authority is so wide-ranging that it could decide to create a joint Franco-German army without 
special parliamentary procedures.101 
                                                
94 Ibid., 75-76. See also Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. Referat Außen-  Sicherheits- und 
Europapolitik 1997, 28. On details of these working groups, see especially, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 
January 1997, 12. 
95 Koenig 1997, 80. 
96 Article 5 of the protocol. See Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 
1993, 152-153. 
97 Koenig 1997, 76-79. 
98 Article 4 of the protocol. See Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 
1993, 152-153. 
99 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. Referat Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 1995, 6. 
100 These typically include the decisions taken as well as joint initiatives. The “joint Franco-German security and 
defense concept” has been among the most widely noted and discussed results of the Council’s activities. For 
its full text, see Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bulletin) 1997. 
101 See Bohle 1988. 
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Figure 1: 
Regularized Franco-German Intergovernmentalism in Defense and Security (since 1989) 
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Economics and Finance 
 
The Elysée Treaty did not specifically mention economics and finance as policy areas in its 
stipulations on Franco-German interaction processes. Over the years, however, it became standard 
practice that the French and German ministers of economics and finance, along with their colleagues 
from other ministries involved in political economic affairs such as agriculture, energy, and transport, 
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regularly participated in the semiannual summit meetings. Franco-German cooperation in these pol-
icy domains was formalized with a Franco-German Council for Economics and Finance in the late 
1980s. Originally planned as a “common coordination organ for economic and monetary policies,” 
the joint economic and finance council was instituted along with numerous other Treaty extensions 
at the fiftieth Franco-German summit in Karlsruhe in November 1987.102  The parliaments of both 
states, along with the Council for Security and Defense, ratified the agreement with huge majorities 
on 12 January 1988.103  The regulations on the new Council were added to the Elysée Treaty as a 
protocol and so became part of the Treaty.104 
 
The German Minister of Economics, the German Minister of Finance, and the French Min-
ister of Economics and Finance, together with the president of the German Bundesbank and the 
French National Bank, compose the Franco-German Economic and Financial Council. The Council 
has a permanent secretariat in Paris to prepare its sessions and follow up on their results. 
 
The Council meets four times a year. Two of these meetings are usually part of the semi-
annual Franco-German summit meetings. It regularly reports to the French president and prime min-
ister and to the German chancellor. It can prepare policies that require decisions from the heads of 
state and governments or the entire governments of the two states.105  The Council usually concludes 
its meetings with a joint press conference of the ministers and central bank presidents on the results 
of the working sessions. The Council publishes communiqués on its decisions and recommenda-
tions.106 
 
The Franco-German Council for Economics and Finance aims at boosting and tightening 
the cooperation between the two states in these policy areas and harmonizing French and German 
positions on issues of international economic and financial matters.107  Article Four of the protocol 
assigns to the Economic and Financial Council four specific tasks: to discuss the basic outlines of the 
two states’ yearly budgets before they are adopted nationally; to discuss the respective national eco-
nomic situations and economic policies in order to coordinate and harmonize French and German 
positions as closely as possible; to discuss the two states’ monetary policies in their national, Euro-
pean, and international aspects, and aims at coordinating and harmonizing them as much as possible; 
and to coordinate and harmonize as much as possible the French and German positions in interna-
tional negotiations on economic and financial matters.108  For example, the Franco-German Council 
tightly coordinated French and German policies in order to fulfill the economic convergence criteria 
of the Maastricht Treaty.109 
 
The Council can build Franco-German ad hoc commissions to do Franco-German “home-
work” on all issues it considers relevant, for example bilateral trade asymmetries or dissimilar Franco-
                                                
102 Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 95. 
103 Ibid., 99. Guérin-Sendelbach 1993, 202-206. 
104 The original denominations for the new “organ” are Conseil Franco-Allemand Economique et Financier and 
Deutsch-Französischer Finanz- und Wirtschaftsrat. See Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut 
Ludwigsburg 1993, 156-157. For the full French and German protocol texts, see ibid., 156-159. For discus-
sions, see, for example, Bremer 1988, 34-36; Frisch 1988. 
105 Handelsblatt, 25 January 1988, 16. 
106 For example, Conseil Economique et Financier Franco-Allemand 1994; Ministère de l'Economie des Fi-
nances et du Budget 1990. 
107 See Article One of the protocol. Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 
1993, 156-157. For an excellent summary of the Council’s workings and goals, see Neue Züricher Zeitung, 30 
January 1988, 17. 
108 See Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 156-157; Ohm 1993; 
Handelsblatt, 25 January 1988, 16; Neue Züricher Zeitung, 30 January 1988, 17. 
109 Handelsblatt, 4 November 1993, 1. 
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German tax and environmental policies.110 Further, it may order joint studies by Franco-German 
working groups composed of ministerial civil servants from the respective ministries, either in pre-
paration for Council meetings or in order to work out details on matters of interest to the Council. 
 
When the Franco-German Economic and Financial Council was instituted, there was po-
litical debate within Germany regarding the tension between the Council’s tasks and the legal-
institutional status of the German Bundesbank. The latter stressed that its full independence would 
not be infringed upon by its president’s membership in the Franco-German Council. The formula 
that resolved the debate was that, unlike the Council for Security and Defense, the Economic and 
Financial Council is a “consultation organ” of the Franco-German cooperation net, rather than a 
“decision organ.” The Economic and Financial Council can take decisions. However, at least for the 
president of the German Bundesbank, they are not binding. Due to the legal status of the Bundes-
bank within the German political system, neither the French or German ministers, nor the German 
chancellor as head of government, has the means to demand the acceptance or implementation of 
joint decisions or policies, or otherwise to discipline the Bundesbank.111  In a governmental statement 
of 4 February 1988, after he had signed the protocol on the Council, Chancellor Kohl declared that 
the independent status of the Bundesbank remained unaffected by the new bilateral council. The 
German Bundestag confirmed Kohl’s statement with a letter when it ratified the protocol.112 
 
Culture, Environment, and Other Policy Areas 
 
France and Germany established the Franco-German Cultural Council with an exchange of 
notes between the foreign ministers of the two states on 22 January 1988.113 The bilateral decision to 
found such a council had been taken during the fiftieth Franco-German consultations in Karlsruhe 
on 12-13 November 1987.114  The council was designed to lend new impulses to art and culture in 
Franco-German cooperation. Specifically, the council has three purposes: to recommend joint 
Franco-German cultural activities; to put forth suggestions to the French and German governments 
on how such activities could be supported; and to contribute to the cultural cooperation between 
France and Germany by collecting and providing information to the publics of the two countries.115 
The Cultural Council independently chooses themes and working areas. Ten “independent person-
alities” from public, cultural, and intellectual life from each country compose the council. The gov-
ernment of the French republic and the German federal government, together with the Länder, 
appoint them for a period of four years.116 
 
The council meets for plenary sessions twice a year, alternating between France and Ger-
many. Since the Cultural Council in particular seeks to strengthen the cultural cooperation between 
French régions and German Länder, the meeting site changes every time.117 
 
                                                
110 Uhlmann 1989. 
111 The Bundesbank frequently celebrated its full institutional independence from both federal and subfederal 
governments; its presidents have frequently acted against their express preferences. The Bundesbank’s status at 
times also complicated or encumbered the work of the Franco-German Economic and Financial Council. 
112 Guérin-Sendelbach 1993, 204-205. 
113 For a preceding Franco-German agreement on cultural cooperation, see Sturm 1983. For an overview of 
Franco-German cultural relations in the post-war period “from bilateral reconciliation to European inte-
gration” see especially Znined-Brand 1999, 83-120. 
114 Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 95. The official names 
of the Council are Haut-Conseil Culturel Franco-Allemand and Deutsch-Französischer Kulturrat. Dokumente, Docu-
ments, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 164-165. 
115 As formulated in the notes of 22 January 1988 exchanged between Hans-Dietrich Genscher, François Léo-
tard, and Jean-Bernard Raimond. The notes are reprinted in Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-
Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 164-167. 
116 Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 164-167, 164-165. 
117 Deutsch-Französischer Kulturrat 1996, 2. 
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During 1995 and 1996, for example, the work of the council stretched from activities such as 
editing a book series on Franco-German affairs and history, organizing a prize for journalistic 
achievements on Franco-German matters, supporting cultural exchange trilaterally between Freiburg, 
Nantes, and Krakow, as well as the Bavarian-French artists exchange. The council also gave fellow-
ships for young artists in areas including writing, photography, painting, acting, and directing, to 
spend a year in the respective other country.118 
 
Jacques Morizet, general secretary of the Franco-German Cultural Council, points out that 
Franco-German cultural cooperation serves a clear purpose. Its goal is to prevent new generations 
from questioning what has been achieved between France and Germany so far.119 It serves to pre-
clude the possibility that “young people in Germany and France” could “banalize the relations be-
tween the two countries.”120 
 
The Franco-German Environmental Council complements the quartet of councils that 
France and Germany added to their net of bilateral cooperation.121  The Environmental Council ori-
ginates from a joint recommendation by French and German coordinators for Franco-German co-
operation André Bord and Rainer Barzel. French and German Foreign Ministers Dumas and Gen-
scher instituted the Environmental Council with an exchange of notes at the beginning of the fifty-
fourth Franco-German summit consultations on 2 November 1989 in Bonn.122 
 
The German environmental minister and the French secretary for the environment serving 
the French prime minister, preside over the Environmental Council. The council is further com-
posed of two representatives of the German Länder and one representative of the German Foreign 
Ministry, as well as a representative of the French Foreign Ministry and two additional French mem-
bers appointed by the French foreign minister and secretary for the environment. Other civil servants 
and experts from relevant groups such as environmental organizations as well as labor and employer 
representatives can be invited on an ad hoc basis to join the council.123 The council meets at least 
twice a year. 
 
The letters that instituted it state that the Environmental Council is to give direction to 
Franco-German cooperation in the area of environmental protection. Specifically, it assigns four 
tasks to the council: to work toward coordination of the environmental policies of the two states; to 
discuss bilateral environmental problems; to discuss French and German positions regarding en-
vironmental policies within the European Union and on the international level; and to develop joint 
French and German initiatives regarding international environmental issues.124  The Franco-German 
Environmental Council met for the first time on 13 February 1990 in Paris, jointly presided over by 
German Environmental Minister Töpfer and French Environmental Secretary Lalonde. Among the 
first tasks it took up were the pollution of the Rhine and pollution of the air by automobile ex-
haust.125 
 
The four councils that France and Germany added to their net of institutionalized interac-
tion in the late 1980s extended and deepened Franco-German regularized intergovernmentalism in 
key policy areas and included the core ministries of foreign affairs, defense, economics, and finance. 
                                                
118 Ibid., 2-3. 
119 Morizet 1993, 117. 
120 Ibid. See also Morizet and Möller 1995. 
121 Its official names are Conseil Franco-Allemand de l’Environement and Deutsch-Französischer Umweltrat. Dokumente, 
Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 160-161. 
122 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bulletin) 1989b, 1038. See also Deutsch-Französisches 
Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 102-103. 
123 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bulletin) 1989b, 121. 
124 Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 160-161. 
125 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 February 1990, 6. 
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It further included the policy areas of culture and environmental protection. Outside of these policy 
areas and ministries, bilateral regularized intergovernmentalism comprising all ministries remained 
part of the ever growing semiannual summit meetings. Furthermore, in other policy areas such as 
education and youth issues,  representatives of the German Länder are part of the Franco-German 
bilateral interaction. A host of Franco-German working groups across all policy domains and many 
issue-specific commissions complement the intergovernmental relations between France and 
Germany. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 
Regularized Bilateral Franco-German Intergovernmentalism 
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III. Elements of Bilateral Social Structure Forty Years On 
 
  “The Franco-German Treaty,” long-time French Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime 
Minister de Murville notes at the Treaty’s twentieth anniversary, “has over time … become an essen-
tial part of the life of our peoples” — “a basic element of the foreign policies of our two countries.126 
“Twenty-five years after its signing,” Morizet holds in 1988, “the Franco-German Treaty has become 
                                                
126  de Murville 1983, 1, 12. 
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a basic component of Franco-German politics.”127  It “makes up the foreign policy constitution of 
the two states,” a German diplomat concurs.128 This “dense coordination and harmonization tex-
ture,”129 with its “intensive consultations,” Ziebura understands, are foundational elements of a new 
type of “structural cooperation between the two countries.”130 
 
For some four decades, the effects of the regularized Franco-German intergovernmentalism 
have codefined the relationship between France and Germany. With standardizing and routinizing 
conduct, binding and socializing personnel, and generating and reproducing social meaning and pur-
pose, this category of practices has helped to construct an international institutional reality. Simul-
taneously, the limits of Franco-German regularized intergovernmentalism have become salient as 
France and Germany frequently have failed to match the ambitions of the Treaty’s provisions and 
extensions. Important French and German foreign policy orientations have often remained deeply 
split.131 The regularization of their intergovernmentalism has helped to make France and Germany 
hang together for over four decades. It has contravened potential rupture. And it has structured 
change in Franco-German relations; it has made possible change within continuity, and continuity 
within change. 
 
Effects 
 
Regularized intergovernmental interaction has at least three kinds of partially overlapping ef-
fects. First, in certain ways and not in others, regularized intergovernmentalism standardizes and rou-
tinizes the conduct of the individual actors involved in the relationship. Between France and Ger-
many, it frames the interaction between the French and German governments and administrations. It 
does so in several ways. 
 
First of all, it helps to define “business as usual” and frames normal ways of handling things. 
It keeps issues on the agenda that concern those with which the institutionalized relationship exists. 
And it makes states “keep in touch” regarding certain issues. Further, it channels why and how to 
solve problems and formulate policies in a wide range of policy domains. 
 
 “The institutionalization of close contacts has become a working instrument that repeatedly 
forces the administrations of both states to explore possibilities for Franco-German cooperation.”132 
The “necessity of preparing two or three meetings a year pushes a need to prepare them into the sec-
ond and third layers of the bureaucracy; common problems are never far from the top of the in-box 
or far out of mind. When leaderships change, the fixed schedule of meetings prevents the new lead-
ers form postponing consultation with their counterparts.”133 
 
Regularized intergovernmentalism creates routines. Such routines and common “codes of 
conduct,” Bjørn Otto Sverdrup contends in a thorough study on Franco-German institutionalization, 
“and exchanges of personnel contributed to develop a common Franco-German set of rules of ap-
propriateness.”134 This is the “routine that distinguishes every good marriage,” journalist Josef Joffe 
declares at the occasion of the Treaty’s thirtieth anniversary.135 “The normality is what is extra-
ordinary in Franco-German affairs,” Prime Minister Lionel Jospin notices, after the seventieth 
                                                
127 Morizet 1988. 
128 Quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 July 1997, 2. 
129 Nonnenmacher 1993. 
130 Ziebura 1978b. 
131 Krotz 2002. 
132 Ménudier 1982, 160. 
133 Friend 1991, 41. 
134 Sverdrup 1994,89. 
135 Joffe 1993. 
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Franco-German summit in Weimar in September 1997.136  And a French public servant compre-
hends that “the originality of the consultations with the Germans rests on the fact that they appear 
normal or routine.“137 
 
The regularized mechanism of consultation and interaction forced de Gaulle and Adenauer’s 
successors to “remain in permanent tight contact.”138 These mechanisms, Chancellor Kohl describes 
what he experienced, establish the “coining discipline of a permanent dialog.”139 
 
Second, regularized intergovernmentalism binds and, over time, socializes personnel. Insti-
tutionalized relations among states have their staff. The Franco-German relationship has in a range 
of ways cultivated cohorts of staff for four decades. 
 
The Treaty’s provisions “have constantly brought together top officials, who might other-
wise have had little personal contact and only a paper knowledge of each other's concerns and prob-
lems.”140 “Independent of daily politics,” the dean of Franco-German analysis Alfred Grosser found 
as early as 1965, regularized official contacts have generated people “who have known each other for 
many years and have acquired the habit of working together … in embassies, in ministries, on the 
staffs of newspapers, in the leadership of unions, political parties and professional organizations of 
both countries.”141 
 
On the one hand, the presence of such groups of people reduces the likelihood of 
misunderstandings and information deficits. More importantly, however, over time such people 
might begin to share the same reference frame and assign similar values to the relations between the 
states for which they work. “Since many high-ranking civil servants work closely with Franco-
German relations for several years,” Sverdrup finds, “they are affected by the institution’s set of 
interpretations, which are neither a French understanding of appropriateness, nor a German one, but 
a Franco-German one.”142 
 
 “The most important result,” French observer Jean Marcel Bouguereau gathers after three 
decades of Franco-German regularized intergovernmentalism, “is the fundamentally changed attitude 
of the French elites toward Germany.”143 Socializing and cultivating personnel working at diverse 
levels of government and across policy areas dampens the potentially disruptive effects of single 
changes in office, even of a particularly important positions, on the overall continuation of the 
relations. Thus, “the Franco-German dialogue transcends the succession of politicians that incarnate 
it.”144 
 
Third, most broadly and most importantly, political processes such as the Franco-German 
regularized intergovernmentalism generate and perpetuate meaning and social purpose. 145  They do 
so in a number of ways. For one, regularized intergovernmentalism creates and reproduces standards 
of normal and legitimate expectations. The ambitious stipulations of the Elysée Treaty do exactly 
                                                
136 Quoted in Germis 1997. 
137 Lequesne 1990, 131. 
138 Ziebura 1978b. 
139 Kohl 1988, 79. 
140 Friend 1991, 41. 
141 Grosser 1965, 26. 
142 Sverdrup 1994, 123. 
143 Bouguereau 1993. 
144 Pirotte 1997a, 10. 
145 For example, in a sense as James March and Johan Olsen have thought about it and employed the term. See 
March and Olsen 1989, especially chapters 3 and 9. Similarly, see Jepperson 1991. On the same point with re-
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that: they formulate baselines for legitimate goals worth striving for, they steer expectations, and they 
define achievement. They shape normality as well as deviation from normality.146 
 
They further provide reasons to want and to do some things, and not to want and not to do 
others—alone or together. They legitimize and make intuitive some courses of action; they de-
legitimize and make implausible others. The Treaty was “in fact less binding in its provisions than in 
its overtones.”147 
 
Such a creation of significance and purpose, for example, may foster pressure “to come up 
with something” or “with something new,” in particular if the relationship is constructive and if 
quantitative interaction density is high, as is the case for France and Germany. “Deadlines infuse 
progress and joint positions since they contribute to direct attention towards new Franco-German 
proposals.” This may generate “pressure to come up with something for the next summit.”148 
 
Finally, regularized intergovernmentalism may breed rudiments of collective identity at the 
international level, however tenuous. Regularization of a certain kind of interaction and communi-
cation also delineates who belongs together with whom and whom not. In all of these ways regu-
larized intergovernmental practices help to stabilize order in international affairs – not understood as 
the absence of conflict, but as regularization. 
 
 “After three decades,” American observer David Calleo reflects, “it seems beyond a merely 
episodic converging of distinct national interests. … a network of institutional structures does frame 
the bilateral relationship in a cooperative mode.”149 “[T]he Treaty,” Rainer Baums finds in a detailed 
study of Franco-German affairs between 1969 and 1982, “could develop its own efficacious dynamic 
(wirksame Eigendynamik) for the Franco-German relationship.”150 
 
Limits 
 
At the same time, the limits of the Franco-German regularized bilateralism, and the Elysée 
Treaty’s unfulfilled ambitions, remain conspicuous. Most obviously, deep Franco-German divergen-
ces in many policy domains continue to persist. Both French and German elites and publics at large 
have remained deeply split in the way they think of their states as collectivities and their respective 
roles in the world. Consequently, basic French and German foreign policy orientations have con-
tinued to diverge fundamentally.151 France and Germany often deviate in their international goals and 
policies. “Franco-German military cooperation in the postwar period,” security analyst Philip Gor-
don for example finds, “seems to have taken place despite important differences in perspective be-
tween the two countries, not because of a fundamental rapprochement of views.”152  In important 
ways there remains a “lack of a common strategic vision and purpose.”153 
                                                
146 Not only those who are committed to the values that they institutionalize share such socially constructed 
baselines of expectations. Typically those indifferent or averse to these values them also share them and use 
them as reference points, when they, for example, rather mockingly call upon the French president to better 
fulfill his duties according to the 1963 Treaty. Compare, for example, Augstein 1996. Yet others mock what in-
stitutionalized processes of with their interaction, meaning, and purpose bring about. Margaret Thatcher, for 
example, warned against a “substructure in Europe … that could undermine the cohesion of the Atlantic al-
liance” in security matters, after President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, all in accordance with Franco-
German regularized intergovernmentalism and the purpose for the relations between France and Germany it 
engendered, had suggested the creation of a Franco-German brigade in 1987. Die Welt, 28 November 1987, 5. 
147 Friend 1991, 39. 
148 Sverdrup 1994, 108. 
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Paradoxically perhaps, the social meaning that it purports make the characteristic limits of 
the Franco-German regularized intergovernmentalism all the more salient. This regularized inter-
governmentalism itself contributes to generating the socially constructed baselines of expectations 
that the French and German states both in their bilateral relations and policies in general often fail to 
meet. Thus, with the social meaning and purpose that it promotes and perpetuates, this bilateral in-
tergovernmental fabric also helps to induce a frequent sense of disappointment or failure.154  These 
regularized interaction patterns have remained efficacious. Simultaneously, difficulties, crises, and dis-
appointments in the relations between France and Germany have persevered. 
 
Ziebura  pointed out as early as the Treaty’s fifteenth anniversary that the extraordinarily 
high expectations toward France and Germany derive not least from the provisions in the Elysée 
Treaty itself. Taking many of its formulations literally, he explicates, “today in all the areas that the 
Treaty covers there had to be largely identical positions of both countries, resulting from a perma-
nent common will-building and decision-making process.”155  In its ambitious objectives, the Treaty 
aimed at creating an “organic connection,” on the basis of which “parallel policies could be worked 
out.”156 “ Without over-interpreting the Treaty text, one can say that it aimed at the generation of a 
fused defense and even armament policy.”157 
 
Seen in this light, while they have never renounced them, France and Germany also have 
never fulfilled the Elysée Treaty’s radical ambitions. While they have been closely tied and cooperated 
on a regular basis, basic foreign policy orientations have remained dissimilar. While their institu-
tionalized relationship has developed and become a pivotal structural element of postwar European 
international politics, their interests, goals, and policies have frequently diverged. While their regular-
ized intergovernmentalism has contributed to construct an elevated baseline of expectations for 
inter-state relations – both in historical terms and for the expectations of much international relations 
theory – characteristic tensions and crises between France and Germany have continued to recur. 
Theirs is a close relationship between often very unlike collective personalities. The limits of Franco-
German regularized intergovernmentalism only mirror these differences. 
 
Hanging Together 
 
On balance, perhaps the most important outgrowth of their regularized intergovern-
mentalism is that it has made France and Germany hang together for four decades. The events of the 
late twentieth century alert us that it does not go without saying that some parts of the social world 
hang together. The entities that once made up the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon did not hang to-
gether: they fell apart; the Soviet Union imploded shortly thereafter with not only the Soviet system 
disappearing, but also the union itself; the German Democratic Republic dissolved into five Länder 
which joined the former Federal Republic; Czechoslovakia separated into two sovereign states. What 
once hung together can fall apart with unsettling rapidity. These historical experiences also remind us 
not to take for granted that some parts of the social world hang together as long as they do. The rela-
tionship between France and Germany has not fallen apart; in spite and irrespective of potential 
domestic and international reasons for doing so. France and Germany have hung together.158 
 
During the 1980s, especially very empirically oriented European observers, close to the daily, 
weekly, monthly, yearly business of politics, began to note the tenacity of the Franco-German rela-
tionship in light of putative factors of rift. They have particularly pointed to two potential factors 
commonly associated with volatility. From the 1960s on, none of them has led to rupture in the 
Franco-German relationship. 
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The first of these are changes of governments and key personnel on one or both sides of the 
Rhine. In a study covering the first two decades of the Elysée Treaty in practice, British observer 
Haig Simonian finds Franco-German relations “highly resilient” to leadership changes.159 Since at 
least the late 1960s, changes of presidents, prime ministers, chancellors, and ministers have not radi-
cally worsened the relations between the two states. 
 
This factor, which many expected to affect Franco-German relations much more strongly 
than it did, also includes the “chemistry” among French and German political leaders, and the per-
sonal proclivities of the individuals in key positions in the French and German states.160 It is well 
known that Franco-German relations produced a number of “men couples” whose personal relations 
went beyond professional interaction and turned into friendships. They include Giscard-Schmidt, 
Kohl-Mitterrand, and Dumas-Genscher. In reverse, other interpersonal relations were difficult and 
often strained. The lack of personal affinity between key personalities has not, however, funda-
mentally undermined or led to ruptures in the processes that define Franco-German relations.161 
 
Second, not only the changes of governments and persons in Paris, Bonn, or both, but also 
the partisan composition of French and German governments, the party coalitions (for Germany) or co-
habitation configurations (for France) have failed to cause rift. “One imagines the everything but uto-
pian case,“ Ziebura warned at the Elysée Treaty’s fifteenth anniversary in January 1978, “that in 
France the ‘united’ left takes over the government, and that in the Federal Republic the CDU/CSU 
wins the majority. Surely, the treaty will ensure that the two governments will still talk to each other; 
but what will be left under such circumstances of the so often evoked ‘organic connection’?”162  The 
“united” left took over government in France in 1981. From 1982 on, the German government was 
led by a CDU/CSU majority. The fourteen years with socialist President Mitterrand and Christian 
Democratic Chancellor Kohl have sometimes been viewed as the third Franco-German honeymoon 
following de Gaulle-Adenauer and Giscard-Schmidt.163 
                                                
159 Simonian 1985, 7. For more forceful statements of the point see Brigouleix 1987; Guérin-Sendelbach 1993, 
29. 
160 Who likes whom and how much, who dislikes whom and how much, frequently receives extensive press 
coverage in France and Germany. Such matters seem part of the Franco-German public space. Journalists, in 
particular, often expect that such personal inclinations will affect Franco-German relations at large. 
161 Nor, for that matter, have these relations dramatically improved as a function of personal “chemistry” 
among top functionaries, diplomats, or civil servants, nor dissolved some regularly recurring and lasting prob-
lems and basic differences between the two. As former Defense Ministry Staatssekretär Lothar Rühl points out, 
“friendship between decision-makers does not infallibly lead to common goals.” Rühl 1997. 
162 Ziebura 1978b. 
163 After both Mitterrand and Kohl had left office, a few journalists – surely a great deal less thoughtful than 
Gilbert Ziebura – put forth the somewhat esoteric conclusion that what Franco-German relations really needed 
were governments composed of parties from different ends of the political spectrum. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, 
UDF, was a liberal conservative, Helmut Schmidt, SPD, a social democrat, Jacques Chirac, RPR, a neo-Gaullist. 
Whether the majority of the French ministers were Gaullists or whether communists hold posts as ministers, 
whether the German foreign minister is a liberal or a green, the defense minister a conservative or a social dem-
ocrat, does not seem to exert a significant impact upon the bilateral relations between France and Germany. 
Also the rise of cohabitation in France, in which president and prime minister and ministers are from different 
political camps, did not disrupt the relationship. In March 1986, it happened for the first time in the Fifth Re-
public’s history that a French president did not have a majority after elections to the national assembly, and had 
to rule with a prime minister and a government, the ministers of which were neither from his own party, nor 
from parties allied with his own party. This first cohabitation, as the novelty quickly became known, lasted until 
May 1988. During the first cohabitation socialist President François Mitterrand co-ruled with neo-Gaullist Prime 
Minister Jacques Chirac (March 1986-May 1988). The second cohabitation lasted from March 1993 to May 1995 
with President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Edouard Balladur (March 1993-May 1995). The third cohabi-
tation (June 1997-May 2002) brought together President Chirac with socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. 
Thies stresses especially the resilience of Franco-German relations against the first cohabitation government. 
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Process, Structure, Change 
 
None of the effects of regularized intergovernmentalism (nor their limits, for that matter), 
rules out change in Franco-German relations themselves, or in French and German foreign policies. 
But they make dramatic change and sudden rupture in this area of European politics less probable.164 
They structure change and allow for continuity within change, and change within continuity. Regu-
larized intergovernmental relations, as social relations in general, change when the interaction pat-
terns and the meaning that they incorporate are reproduced differently over time. But even if they 
evolve, they typically display a certain regularity and stability over time. This is what makes them so-
cial structures; and this is what distinguishes different sets of regularized intergovernmentalism 
among states from one another, cross-nationally or historically. 
 
The characteristic features of Franco-German regularized intergovernmentalism in the wake 
of the Elysée Treaty has been a defining component of Europe’s postwar regional international 
structure. Fundamental change in the set of processes that make up this regularized bilateralism 
would constitute the transformation of a structural element of the European polity as it has evolved 
over the past half century. Such a shift were likely to have consequences well beyond the bilateral 
Franco-German realm. 
                                                                                                                                              
Thies 1986, D 233. The adaptation of the third cohabitation, for example, to Franco-German relations in 1997, 
led some commentators to spell cohabitation “Kohlhabitation.” See von Münchhausen 1997. 
164 Compare Sverdrup 1994, 117-125. 
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